Power & Energy PQC Solution

Power grids are critical information infrastructure built on field devices that live 10–20 years and operations that cannot be interrupted. That combination — long-lived hardware, non-stop availability, and regulated cryptography — makes post-quantum migration both urgent and uniquely constrained for the energy sector.

Why act now

• Power is CII. Grid dispatch, control, and substation systems are critical information infrastructure, so GM/T 0133-2024 (CII crypto requirements, effective 2025-07-01) applies, alongside 电力监控系统安全防护 requirements and 等保 (with core control systems at level 3+).
• Devices outlive the threat horizon. RTUs, IEDs, and protection relays are deployed for 10–20 years. Cryptographic choices made today will still be running when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) arrives — firmware-signing keys in particular must survive the entire device lifetime.
• HNDL on operational data. Dispatch instructions, grid topology, and metering data have multi-year secrecy value. Recorded today, they can be decrypted later once a CRQC exists (Mosca X+Y>Z).
• 商用密码合规 & 密评. Commercial-cryptography application security assessment (密评, GB/T 39786-2021, GM/T 0115/0116-2021) is mandatory for CII and 等保 level-3+ systems, with annual re-assessment.

Risk & asset map

Symmetric algorithms (SM4/ZUC, AES) are only Grover-weakened and are mitigated by larger sizes; the Shor-broken asymmetric layers (SM2/SM9, RSA/ECC/ECDSA) are the migration targets.

Constraints that shape the design

• Resource-constrained devices. Field devices have limited CPU, RAM, and power budgets. Favour lightweight ML-KEM/ML-DSA parameter sets and hardware acceleration (ARM TrustZone, dedicated crypto chips) where the device platform allows.
• Availability is sacred. Migration must not break operations — use in-place, phased, and reversible changes, with hybrid modes that degrade gracefully and never a flag-day cutover on live grid control.
• Long-lived firmware signing. Because firmware-signing keys must remain trustworthy for the device lifetime, prefer the conservative hash-based SLH-DSA for firmware/boot signatures even where lattice schemes serve elsewhere.

Recommended architecture

• Hybrid first. Combine classical (SM2/ECDH) with ML-KEM via a KDF for key exchange, and dual signatures (SM2/ECDSA + ML-DSA) for authentication — see hybrid.html.
• Lightweight where possible, hash-based for firmware. Use efficient ML-KEM/ML-DSA on capable platforms; use SLH-DSA for long-lived firmware and boot-chain signing.
• Protocol retrofits & isolation. Tunnel legacy industrial protocols (Modbus/IEC 61850/DNP3) through PQC-secured TLS/IPsec gateways; keep network isolation and segmentation as defence-in-depth where in-protocol PQC is not yet feasible.
• Crypto-agility & inventory. Build on construction-blueprint.html, and start from a full cryptographic inventory and risk model.

Phased roadmap

Reference case

The 2025 安全牛 report (see cn-vendors.html) describes a power-industry PQC study led with Sansec / 三未信安, validating the device-aware, phased approach for grid environments.

KPIs & success criteria

• 100% inventory coverage of control-centre, monitoring, and field crypto; every Shor-vulnerable asset risk-scored.
• 密评 readiness against GB/T 39786 / GM/T 0133-2024 with no critical findings.
• Zero availability incidents attributable to migration (in-place, reversible changes).
• Hybrid key exchange & dual signatures live at dispatch and remote-O&M edges by end of Phase 1.
• SLH-DSA firmware signing adopted for all new device builds; legacy asymmetric crypto on a published decommission path.

Standards & references

• Industry scenarios and telecom (adjacent CII sector)
• Construction blueprint — crypto-agility & migration patterns.
• Hybrid key exchange & dual signatures
• Harvest Now, Decrypt Later threat model and CN vendors & reference cases
• Resources — full standards register