Finance & Banking PQC Solution
Financial systems combine long-retention secrets, regulated cryptography, and a deep dependence on Shor-vulnerable public-key algorithms. That makes banking one of the first sectors that must act on post-quantum migration — both to defeat "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks and to stay compliant with China's commercial-cryptography regime.
Why act now
The drivers in finance are simultaneously a threat and a compliance obligation:
- HNDL on long-lived data. Account records, transaction histories, KYC/identity material, and contracts retain value for 10–30 years. An adversary can record today's
TLS/IPsecsessions or exfiltrate ciphertext now and decrypt it once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) exists. By Mosca's inequality (X+Y>Z), if secrecy lifetime plus migration time exceeds the time to a CRQC, you are already exposed. - 商用密码合规 & 密评. Under the Cryptography Law (effective 2020-01-01, SCA), commercial-cryptography application security assessment (密评, per
GB/T 39786-2021andGM/T 0115/0116-2021) is mandatory for CII, 等保 level-3+ systems, and important government/finance systems, with annual re-assessment. - CII crypto requirements.
GM/T 0133-2024(effective 2025-07-01) raises crypto requirements for critical information infrastructure — most large banks operate CII. - Sector & cross-border rules. PBoC / financial-industry
JR/Tstandards govern domestic crypto usage; PCI DSS and GDPR apply to cross-border payment and data flows. 等保三级 (MLPS level 3) applies to core financial systems.
Risk & asset map
Symmetric primitives (SM3/SM4/ZUC, AES) are only weakened by Grover and are mitigated with larger sizes (AES-256, ZUC-256). The urgent targets are the Shor-broken asymmetric layers (SM2/SM9, RSA/ECC/ECDSA).
| Asset / system | Crypto in use | Quantum risk | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Payment & transaction systems | TLS, SM2/ECDSA signatures, SM2/ECDH key exchange | Shor-vulnerable asymmetric layer; HNDL on session keys | Highest |
| Core banking ledger | SM2/RSA signing, TLS to subsystems | Shor-vulnerable signing & transport | High |
| Financial HSM / key management | SM2/RSA key wrapping, ECDSA | Shor-vulnerable asymmetric wrapping; firmware-bound | High |
| CBDC / digital-currency wallets | SM2 / ECDSA signatures, SM9 IBC | Shor-vulnerable — long-lived wallet keys | High |
| Cross-border payment & interbank | TLS, RSA/ECDSA PKI, message signing | Shor-vulnerable; HNDL on intercepted traffic | Medium |
| Long-retention records & archives | Stored ciphertext (SM4/AES), SM2-wrapped keys | Grover-only data, but Shor-vulnerable key-wrap — classic HNDL | Medium–High |
| Symmetric bulk encryption | SM4 / AES-128 / ZUC | Grover-only — move to AES-256 / ZUC-256 | Low (size bump) |
Recommended architecture
The design goal is crypto-agility: replace hard-coded algorithms with negotiable, swappable suites so future parameter changes do not require re-architecting. Build on the patterns in construction-blueprint.html.
- Hybrid key exchange. Combine a classical exchange (
ECDHorSM2) withML-KEMvia a KDF, so a session stays secure if either component holds. This preserves 国密 compliance while adding quantum resistance — see hybrid.html. - Dual signatures. Sign with both a classical scheme (
SM2orECDSA) andML-DSA, giving verifiable backward compatibility and post-quantum integrity. - PQC-ify PKI & HSM. Issue hybrid/PQC certificates, add PQC support in HSM firmware and key-management, and plan for larger key/signature sizes. See pki.html.
- High-assurance reference. CNSA 2.0 (
ML-KEM-1024+ML-DSA-87) is a useful upper-bound profile for the most sensitive flows. - Inventory first. No migration without a cryptographic bill of materials — see discovery.html and the quantum-risk-model.html.
Phased roadmap
| Phase | Window | Focus | Key outcomes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 | Now – 18 mo | Discovery, 密评 readiness, pilot | Cryptographic inventory & risk map; 密评 gap analysis against GB/T 39786; pilot hybrid key exchange on a payment/transaction channel; crypto-agility framework. |
| Phase 2 | 18 – 36 mo | Core banking, HSM & PKI | Dual signatures in core ledger; PQC-capable HSM firmware; hybrid/PQC PKI issuance; CBDC/wallet key strategy. |
| Phase 3 | 36 mo+ | Peripheral, cross-border, decommission | Extend to cross-border & interbank links; AES-256/ZUC-256 symmetric uplift; decommission legacy RSA/ECC and pure-classical certificates. |
Reference cases
Synthesized from the 2025 安全牛 report on the cn-vendors.html page: 银河证券 ran an anti-quantum pilot (with Koal / 格尔软件), and a digital-currency exchange deployed a hybrid scheme combining classical and PQC key exchange. These confirm that hybrid-first, pilot-led migration is the practical CN-finance path.
KPIs & success criteria
- 100% cryptographic asset coverage in the inventory; every Shor-vulnerable asset risk-scored.
- 密评 readiness with no critical findings against
GB/T 39786/GM/T 0133-2024. - Hybrid key exchange live on all external payment/transaction channels by end of Phase 2.
- Dual-signature coverage on core-banking and CBDC flows; PQC-capable HSM/PKI in production.
- Legacy pure-classical asymmetric crypto retired on a published decommission schedule.
Standards & references
- GM compliance — 密评 & commercial cryptography —
GB/T 39786-2021,GM/T 0133-2024, 《密码法》. - Hybrid key exchange & dual signatures
- PQC-ready PKI and cryptographic discovery
- Quantum risk model and CN vendors & reference cases
- Resources — full standards register
金融与银行后量子解决方案
金融系统集长期保密数据、受监管的密码以及对易受 Shor 攻击的公钥算法的深度依赖于一身,这使银行业成为最先必须行动的后量子迁移行业之一——既要抵御先收集、后解密(Harvest Now, Decrypt Later, HNDL)攻击,也要满足国家商用密码合规要求。
为何现在就要行动
金融行业的驱动力既是威胁,也是合规义务:
- 长效数据面临 HNDL。账户记录、交易历史、KYC 身份资料以及合同的价值可保持 10 至 30 年;攻击者今天即可记录
TLS/IPsec会话或窃取密文,待具备密码学意义的量子计算机(CRQC)出现后再行解密。根据 Mosca 不等式(X+Y>Z),若保密寿命加迁移时间超过 CRQC 出现的时间,你就已经处于暴露状态。 - 商用密码合规与密评。依据《密码法》(2020-01-01 起施行,主管机构为 SCA),商用密码应用安全性评估(密评,依据
GB/T 39786-2021与GM/T 0115/0116-2021)对关键信息基础设施(CII)、等保三级及以上系统以及重要政务与金融系统属强制要求,且需每年复评。 - CII 密码要求。
GM/T 0133-2024(2025-07-01 起施行)提升了关键信息基础设施的密码要求,而多数大型银行均属 CII。 - 行业与跨境规则。人民银行与金融行业
JR/T标准规范境内密码使用,跨境支付与数据流动还需满足 PCI DSS 与 GDPR;核心金融系统适用等保三级。
风险与资产图谱
对称原语(SM3/SM4/ZUC、AES)仅被 Grover 削弱,可通过加大长度(AES-256、ZUC-256)缓解;紧迫目标是会被 Shor 攻破的非对称层(SM2/SM9,RSA/ECC/ECDSA)。
| 资产 / 系统 | 所用密码 | 量子风险 | 优先级 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 支付与交易系统 | TLS、SM2/ECDSA 签名、SM2/ECDH 密钥交换 | 易受 Shor 攻击的非对称层;会话密钥面临 HNDL | 最高 |
| 核心银行账务 | SM2/RSA 签名、子系统间 TLS | 易受 Shor 攻击的签名与传输 | 高 |
| 金融 HSM 与密钥管理 | SM2/RSA 密钥包装、ECDSA | 易受 Shor 攻击的非对称包装,且与固件绑定 | 高 |
| CBDC 与数字货币钱包 | SM2/ECDSA 签名、SM9 标识密码 | 易受 Shor 攻击,钱包密钥长期有效 | 高 |
| 跨境支付与行间交互 | TLS、RSA/ECDSA PKI、报文签名 | 易受 Shor 攻击,截获流量面临 HNDL | 中 |
| 长期留存记录与归档 | 存储密文(SM4/AES)、SM2 包装密钥 | 数据仅 Grover 相关,但密钥包装易受 Shor 攻击,典型 HNDL | 中至高 |
| 对称批量加密 | SM4 / AES-128 / ZUC | 仅 Grover 相关,迁移至 AES-256 / ZUC-256 | 低(加大长度) |
推荐架构
设计目标是密码敏捷性:以可协商、可替换的算法套件取代硬编码算法,使未来调整参数无需重构架构。可基于 construction-blueprint.html 中的模式构建。
- 混合密钥交换。通过 KDF 将经典交换(
ECDH或SM2)与ML-KEM结合,只要任一组件未被攻破,会话即安全;这在增加抗量子能力的同时保留国密合规,详见 hybrid.html。 - 双重签名。同时使用经典方案(
SM2或ECDSA)与ML-DSA签名,兼顾可验证的向后兼容与后量子完整性。 - PKI 与 HSM 后量子化。签发混合或纯 PQC 证书,在 HSM 固件与密钥管理中加入 PQC 支持,并为更大的密钥与签名尺寸预留余量,详见 pki.html。
- 高保障参考。CNSA 2.0(
ML-KEM-1024+ML-DSA-87)可作为最敏感流程的上限参考画像。 - 先盘点。没有密码物料清单就不要迁移,参见 discovery.html 与 quantum-risk-model.html。
分阶段路线图
| 阶段 | 时间窗 | 重点 | 关键产出 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 第一阶段 | 当下至 18 个月 | 盘点、密评就绪、试点 | 密码资产盘点与风险图谱;对照 GB/T 39786 的密评差距分析;在某条支付交易通道试点混合密钥交换;搭建密码敏捷框架。 |
| 第二阶段 | 18 至 36 个月 | 核心银行、HSM 与 PKI | 核心账务引入双重签名;HSM 固件支持 PQC;签发混合或 PQC PKI;制定 CBDC 与钱包密钥策略。 |
| 第三阶段 | 36 个月以上 | 外围、跨境、退役 | 扩展至跨境与行间链路;对称层提升至 AES-256/ZUC-256;退役遗留 RSA/ECC 与纯经典证书。 |
参考案例
综合 2025 年安全牛报告(见 cn-vendors.html 页面):银河证券联合格尔软件(Koal)开展了抗量子试点,某数字货币交易所部署了结合经典与 PQC 密钥交换的混合方案。这些案例印证了"混合优先、试点引领"是国内金融迁移的务实路径。
KPI 与成功标准
- 盘点覆盖率达 100%,每项易受 Shor 攻击的资产均完成风险评分。
- 对照
GB/T 39786/GM/T 0133-2024达到密评就绪,无重大问题。 - 第二阶段末,所有对外支付交易通道均启用混合密钥交换。
- 核心银行与 CBDC 流程实现双重签名覆盖,HSM 与 PKI 支持 PQC 并投产。
- 按公布的退役时间表淘汰遗留的纯经典非对称密码。
标准与参考
- 国密合规 密评与商用密码——
GB/T 39786-2021、GM/T 0133-2024、《密码法》。 - 混合密钥交换与双重签名
- 面向 PQC 的 PKI 与 密码发现盘点
- 量子风险模型 与 国产厂商与参考案例
- 资源链接 完整标准登记册